The article aims at explaining the alliance choices of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council after the Obama Presidency from a theoretical point of view. During the last eight years, Saudi Arabia and its neighbours felt neglected by Washington and considered the US commitment to guarantee their security to be weakened. Using a modified version of a "balance of interests" model, the study presents four possible scenarios available to Gulf states in the post-Obama era and analyses them through the lenses of probability and durability. Saudi Arabia has already stepped up and become more pro-active in recent years, but the economic sustainability of its current foreign policy is highly questionable. While in the short term it is likely that US foreign policy will accept the Gulf countries' strategic considerations under the Trump presidency, the presence of Washington will probably decrease over time. That is why, in the long term, the GCC has to either find a new protector or redefine its role in the regional status quo.
in the investigation. Given the fact that costs (and the willingness to pay for these costs) play an important role in alliance-making, it is self-explanatory that the participants of cooperation would like the other(s) to pay as much as possible (especially in the case of lion-lamb and wolf-jackal relations). Nonetheless, we cannot presume perfect knowledge or complete information in interstate relations, therefore it will be the perceptions, as to what a given party is inclined to pay, that will shape alliance formation.
From this follows that one needs to apply the model only from the perspective of a specific actor. The evaluation of the status quo by different states -both friends and foes -can be and surely is formed in different social context, therefore there won't necessarily be two states which sees the regional balance of power (or the role of different actors) in the same way. Secondly, the model may be adapted to the peculiar systemic attributes of the MENA region. Due to the decreasing importance of systemic conflicts which structure international relations in the region (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the IraqiIranian rivalry), Kristina Kausch (2014) describes the current state of affairs as "competitive multipolarity," which effects alliance-making to a great extent. According to her (Ibid: 11), "rather than forming cohesive blocs and entering long-term alignments, a range of regional and external players of different sizes and weights are likely to compete in shifting, overlapping alliances. Past strategic orientations can no longer be taken for granted. In a region marked by growing insecurity and competitive multipolarity, alliances are likely to take more passing, functional forms."
Besides the questionable stability of long-term alliances, competitive multipolarity has two main effects on interstate relations. Firstly, it is not just the durability of relations which comes under pressure, but also their multi-sectoral nature.
Even if two states form an alliance in a specific policy question, it is highly unlikely that they have the same opinion in other areas. This leads to incoherent relations, namely a situation in which two actors cooperate on one issue even as they do not collaborate or perhaps compete on another. The perfect example could be relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar: they have cooperated to some extent in questions such as the Syrian civil war, the Bahraini intervention, or oil price policy, while at the same time they fought a quasi-proxy war in Egypt between the "revolutions" of 2011 and 2013. Consequently, it is hardly impractical to investigate the "status quo" and the dynamics of interstate relations in general. One has to focus on a limited set of policy areas.
In this framework, states which can communicate with all other actors have more leverage, even if they are relatively small states. As Kausch states:
"There has emerged a new layer of ambitious small and midsize powers, each of which has sought to carve out an independent foreign policy profile and clout. These swing states -including widely diverse powers with often clashing interests, such as Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Egypt -can tilt the balance of power in the Middle East" (Kausch, 2016) .
These swing states can be quite flexible regarding their interests and can maintain ties with pro-status quo players and revisionists at the same time. Thus they constitute a different, fifth role in the adapted model presented here.
Alliance options of the GCC states
The modified version of the balance of interests model helps us understand the dilemmas in GCC-US relations. Forming alliances with external powers has always played an important role in tribal rivalries and (later on) in regime survival in the Gulf region (Davidson, 2011: 1-2) , since these external actors were usually stronger than local actors (Commins, 2014: 1) . The KSA and its small neighbours needed protection from both Iran and Iraq, both of which represented a political threat (that of Shia Islamism and PanArabism) as well as a military threat, simultaneously. Without the US security umbrella, the monarchies would not have been able to protect themselves (Kostiner, 1998) .
Although the alliance with the US (which has been built up gradually) 5 does not go without unfavourable consequences for the regimes in question (Lawson, 2011: 56-68) , it has been essential in the survival of these states.
In this framework, we can conceptualise the behaviour of the GCC states as playig the role of lambs, while the United States is taking the role of a lion that, when necessary, intervenes to deter or defeat a prospective or actual aggressor. Since 1979, and especially since 2003, Iran is viewed to be the wolf that aims at remaking the regional power constellation and enlarge its sphere of influence considerably. During the last years, Tehran gained leverage in the civil wars of the region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and, in the Saudi narrative, in Yemen (Henderson, 2016) . Therefore, so goes the by now commonplace argument (e.g. Judis, 2017), the Obama administration did not do enough to tackle the Iranian threat: it did not intervene firmly in the Syrian civil war against Bassar al-Assad, and it failed to provide decisive assistance to Saudi Arabia's anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen, even as it offered Iran a way out of the sanctions regime with the nuclear deal (Goldenberg -Dalton, 2015) . These developments questioned the perception of the US as a lion in the anti-Iranian "alliance," putting pressure on the GCC to redefine their role in this constellation accordingly. In the meantime, the critique coming from the Obama administration regarding the role of the GCC can also be translated as a debate on the cost-sharing inside the alliance; at least the language used by Washington ("freeriders", "Saudi Arabia was not doing enough"; see Nazer, 2016) implies so.
In the following pages, four possible scenarios are presented from the perspective of the GCC which ceteris paribus have the potential to provide the necessary level of security and stability for them in the region.
Option 1: The re-emergence of the United States as a lion
The most optimistic scenario for the GCC is for Washington to retake its position as a meaningful ally that is willing the pay a lion's share of the price of defence. In this case, the problems detected in bilateral relations may be re-interpreted as buttemporary symptoms of failure (of Obama's policy in the Middle East). This scenario may provide a high level of security with low costs to the GCC members.
There are already some indications that the Trump presidency will seek to emerge once again as a lion in the Gulf. King Salman was one of the first Middle Eastern heads of state with whom the new president held a phone conversation, discussing the establishment of "safe zones" in Syria and Yemen, the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, and cooperation on Iran (Reuters, 2017 national security strategy of the United States, which amonted to a doctrinal manifestation of Obama's "pivot to Asia" policy, was considered to be a reaction to the "changing global strategic environment" (Balogh, 2012) . The American presence in the MENA region, according to some experts, became too costly and pointless, a result of "imperial overstretch" (Simon -Stevenson, 2015) . The main national interests of the United States rest in Pacific Asia, not in the Middle East.
The importance of the Persian Gulf may be slowly depreciating in Washington.
As Charles Glaser and Rosemary Kelanic (2016) pointed out recently, the incentive to maintain a huge American presence in this region used to be key both to security and prosperity, but it may be timely to re-evaluate the validity of this assumption. This "raises the threshold for military involvement" (Ibid: 123), lowering the costs the US may be willing to fulfil its commitments in the region. Moreover, argue Glaser and Kelanic, there are in fact other, less costly ways for Washington to pursue its regional interests than military presence (some of these directly contradict Saudi strategic calculations, e.g. the creation of an inclusive regional security architecture).
All in all, the majority of scholars agree that the American presence in the Middle East and the Gulf is likely to decrease in the coming decades. While the interests of the US are unlikely to change to a great extent, the price Washington is willing to pay for them will decrease. Therefore, on the basis of the first few weeks of the Trump presidency, one can come to the conclusion that a scenario featuring increasing US commitment has a high probability in the short run, but is unlikely to be sustained in the long run.
Option 2: Finding a new lion
Due to the systematic pressure on Washington to pivot to Asia described in the previous section, it is a very realistic scenario that the Gulf countries may have to accommodate to the diminishing interest of the United States in the MENA region. In this case, the United
States would perpetually and meaningfully transform into a lamb from a lion, thus the Gulf countries would have to find other options. One such option is that they may seek to find a new "lion".
In the past years, many analysts pointed to indications that the GCC is searching for new allies. Possible partners could be those states which share in the interests of the Gulf countries and may at the same time be disinterested in the possible shift of the US stance in the region: most notably Israel. Numerous reports (Guzansky -Neubauer, 2014; Henderson, 2015; Ramani, 2015; Cafiero -Wagner, 2016; Shezaf 2016) The GCC can also look for a protector outside of the region. First and foremost, the European Union is the most important economic partner of the Gulf countries, with rapidly growing ties between the two sides. However, the lack of effective capabilities, the slowness of decision-making, the lack of interests, and the somewhat politicised nature of Gulf investments in Europe makes the EU a partner of questionable reliability.The United Kingdom has nevertheless begun to develop its presence in the Gulf: the first British naval base in Manama, Bahrain has recently opened, after the absence of a permanent British naval presence for decades (Telegraph, 2016) . Prime
Minister Theresa May expressed the country's willingness to strengthen cooperation with the GCC (Al Jazeera, 2016) . This process can even be exacerbated by the Brexit -London promised a quick start of negotiations for a free trade agreement between the UK and the GCC (The National, 2016), a question which has been stuck between the EU and the GCC for decades.
Besides the United Kingdom, other actors seem only theoretical possibilities.
Russia is building up its presence in the MENA region, although its activities in Syria and its support provided for Iran are currently harmful for the GCC's interests. Until this changes, Moscow can only be a priority partner in economic terms (Dutkiewicz, 2016) .
Relations cannot be strategic, only incoherent. In line with this, Ray Takeyh and Hasib Sabbagh (2015) conclude, "After centuries of relying on external empires -first British and then Americanto safeguard its territory and protect its regional interests, the House of Saud is beginning to rely on its own resources."
Apart from the Yemeni intervention, we can see evidence of this behaviour in the Sunni Arab anti-terrorist cooperation organised by Saudi Arabia, or the exacerbated usage of the League of Arab Nations to forge regional unity against Iran and to establish Gulf leadership in the Middle East (Hannah, 2016).
Nonetheless, many experts question the ability of the GCC to uphold this status.
The smaller members are too weak in absolute terms, while Saudi Arabia cannot afford to pay the huge costs deriving from the lion's role. Since the fall in oil prices beginning in 2014, the budgets of oilexporting countries came under severe pressure (Hannah,
Conclusion
Based on the modified model of the balance of interests, four scenarios were presented in this article as to the GCC states' basic alliance options. For them, the cheapest and most advantageous of these would be if the United States would be willing to re-emerge as a lion: as a fierce protector of the status quo (1). Lacking that, the GCC states can either try to find a new defender (2), or reposition themselves as the lion (3), or as a swing state (4).
The two most important dimension in which we have to analyse the plausibility of these possibilities is that of time, along with the differences among the GCC members.
First of all, Options 1 and 3 are only available in the short or middle term -due to systematic changes as well as domestic political and economic reasons, neither the United
States nor the GCC can afford to pay too much to preserve the status quo for decades. For this reason, Options 2 and 4 are more likely in the middle and especially the longer term.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states are in a different position.
While the smaller monarchies may be suitable to become swing states, the same cannot be said of Saudi foreign policy.
With a view to this, the most probable scenario for the future is that in the short term, Saudi Arabia will strengthen its lion role to the extent to which its economic resources and its capabilities allow it, while also trying to persuade the Trump presidency to re-take its role as the ultimate protector of the status quo. In this case, smaller Gulf states -especially Qatar and Oman -could remain swing states. At the same time, Riyadh and its neighbours need to prepare for the post-oil/post-Trump era as well, and should accordingly seek to create a more stable and durable alliance system. They can do this in two ways: either by making alliances with new players, or by redefining their interests and the status quo.
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